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Abstract 
 Ombudsman or Mediator represents an institution that more and more is being 
introduced in different experiences of national institutional organization. This study aims to 
analyze the operation and the main features of this institution, whose main task is to tear 
down the wall that separates citizens from public administration. Ombudsman is a 
mechanism, one of the aspects of democracy that exists for years. Since the period of 
antiquity, as in Ancient Greece and the Roman Empire also, different institutions can be 
estimated in current forms of the Ombudsman, because of similar competencies and 
subjective interests that tutelage against the power of public administration of any time. The 
institution of Ombudsman in antiquity period has been present under different models and 
nominations, ranging from the effors, the tribuni plebis up to defensor civitatis. Immediately 
after completion of this analysis, mainly comparative, we can say that there are no important 
differences in space and the time at which the Ombudsman has become part of different 
countries, when we consider his role and main functions, also the modality of interior 
organization.  Since the historical figure of the Swedish Parliamentary Commissioner, today, 
this institution is generally known as the Protector of Citizens, the bridge between civil 
society and the administrative apparatus, and every person who sees himself as a victim of 
an injustice by the Public Administration can be subject of his inquiry. So, the Ombudsman 
is present in almost all countries, although under different names, like in Spain known as 
Defensor del Pueblo, in Italy known as Garante, in France, the land of strong republican 
tradition and centralized known as Médiateur de la République etc… 
 
Keywords: Civil Defender, ombudsman, parliamentary commissioner 
 
1.1 Historical Developments 
 So as I also stated in the introduction, we can identify experiences in this area dating 
from the time of antiquity. Various institutions, both in ancient Greece and the Roman 
Empire, though under other names should be validated with the current forms of 
Ombudsman, because in they have in common the same skills and the same subjective 
interests to be protected against excessive power of the public administration of all time. 
This is because in the words of Rousseau (Rousseau, 2002): "sometimes serves to protect the 
ruler against the government, as they did in Rome the tribunes of the people, sometimes to 
support the government against the people, as it does now in Venice, the Council of Ten, and 
sometimes to maintain balance on the one hand and on the other, as did the ephors in 
Sparta". With regard to the historical facts, I want to make a clarification. In the introduction 
I presented this institution as a mechanism, an essential feature of democracy. Several 
studies in this area support my thesis (Wennergren,1973). As for me, I bind the historical 
evolution of the Ombudsman with the origin of democracy. We recognize the origins of 
democracy precisely in that period of history known as antiquity, however, the democracy 
that we know is a product of the twentieth century, in which it is granted the right to vote to 
every single individual, including women here (Dahl,2006). In that period of the ancient 
institution of the Ombudsman has been present in different designs and denominations, from 
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the Beginning ecdici and syndici(Mannino,1984) and then continuing with the ephors, the 
tribunes and the defensor civitatis plebis. 
 
1.1.1 The ephors 
 The ephors (Paoli), properly "overseers" were a magistracy of Sparta. They formed a 
board of five members, whose decisions were taken by majority vote, and they were elected 
by the people. Their main task was to control the entire administration of the state. Precisely 
the first mentions of the ephors have occurred since the second half of the sixth century BC, 
when the people wanted to assert his right to exercise control over the administration of the 
state. In fact, in a city like Sparta, the ephors also represented the only effective control that 
the people possessed. They had extended competence. They could : 
 - Impose taxes 
 - Issue arrest warrants 
 - Dismiss the judges 
 - Directing wars also 
 - Also check out the King 
 On the latter claim, there is also a historical fact that can testify that the power of the 
ephors was not limited even before the King, and it is for this reason that all this power was 
called tyrannical. A famous Spartan King, named Pausanias, the winner of the Persians at 
Plataea (479 BC) suspected of secret understandings with the King of Persia, was been 
arrested and sentenced to death by the ephors. Everything said here leads us to the 
conclusion that even Sparta, the city that was more reluctant to democratic systems had an 
institution through which his people could freely exercise his will. 
 
1.1.2. Tribunes plebis 
 The tribune was built from the beginning of the republican constitution and became 
the instrument of which the plebs use to achieve equality legal with the aristocracy. It is a 
structure that is established by "establish an exact proportion between the constituent parts of 
the state, or when it causes can not be eliminated without altering the relationships pose. A 
special type of the judiciary, which replaces each term in its true relationship and that serves 
as a link or middle term between both the prince and the people, and between the prince and 
the king, and, when it is necessary between both sides at the same time"(Rousseau, 2002). 
Invested with a potestas Sacrosancta, meant that the tribunes had the opportunity to object 
to all magistrates, paralyzing the action. It was not a constitutive part of the state and should 
not participate in any measure nor the executive nor the legislative branch, but in this his 
power is greater: because not being able to do anything he stoped everything(Rousseau, 
2002). But the tribune was not a magistracy of the Republic but an internal charge of the 
plebes, a position that no nobleman could play (was prevented by a lex sacrata) unless 
waived its privileges of caste, and he made the transitio ad plebem himself to become a 
plebes(Cassola,1989). The sources provide three data relating to acts performed by the 
religious community in the foundation of the plebeian tribune : 
                - a lex sacrata 
                - a iusiurandum 
                - some caerimoniae . 
 The tribune is not sacrosanct for the mere fact that the plebes wants (Fabbrini,1971). 
The plebes wants to impose its civitas tribunus and has full confidence in him, because the 
tribunus is sacrosanctus . The assumptions that see in iusiurandum the decisive factor  of the 
sacredness, sacrosanctitas itself, capture  only a purely negative aspect , the "inviolability" in 
fact. But the inviolability itself is incomprehensible if we do not descend from sacrosanctitas. 
The positive nature of sakros was instead given to the tribune on the Monte Sacro, through 
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sacred ceremonies: the tribune was invested them with the power of magic from which 
sprang result for the inviolability of his person. The year 494 was a decisive year for the 
plebeian community, as they have formally recognized the religious foundation of their 
community and its leaders. After this decisive moment another major challenge presented 
itself in the fate of the plebeian community: they had to validate the existence of their 
community against the civitas as a whole. The existential validity of the plebeian tribunes 
could only occur as a result of an agreement between them and the patricians. It is true that 
initially the plebeians have created and sustained the tribune revolutionary way, but it is true 
that it was a peaceful revolution. The tribune is unarmed and does not resort to force 
(Fabbrini,1971). Since these facts, though on religious foundations, the plebeians in 494 
have made a serious act of civil disobedience, after which they would have deserved death. 
Unless it had happened a new fact: that the Roman patrician religious community had not 
condescended to recognize the value of religious-legal and therefore also for acts committed 
by the plebes, ratifying this act. Given that religious ideas on which it was based were the 
plebeian community foreign to the Roman religion as established by the popes, Rome 
accepted it then with a different act with the act by which we accept the things that come 
from abroad. Therefore, the relevant college to accomplish that feat was that of feziali. In 
front of feziali, the Roman community and community plebeian is recognized as autonomous 
religious communities worship: that you could integrate only putting those  in a position of 
equality under the protection of a deity from both recognized as the supreme: Jupiter. The 
period from the secession of Monte Sacro until the lex Hortensia is the heroic age of the 
tribune of the plebs because at this time the plebes maintains a revolutionary attitude and 
consequently reaches the legal equality with the patricians(Fabbrini,1971).The tape decisive 
in this process of integration are: the Twelve Tables and the leges Liciniae Sextiae. During 
the period decemvirale (451-450), the tribune of the plebs was suspended and was only 
restored in 449, when the new Republic was founded and were reconquered 
freedom(Fabbrini,1971).So the college of tribunes, consisting of ten members, become 
effective on 10 -XII- 449. After this brief historical overview of the creation and affirmation 
of the tribunes plebis would be better if we specify what they consist of the fundamental 
powers of that authority. The main function that the tribunes possessed was to auxilium that 
lent to the single plebe or the populace as a whole(Fabbrini,1971).The auxilium was 
expressed not only through the negative power of defense and punishment practiced against 
those who violate the rights of the people, but also in the positive thing to talk to the people, 
to call him, to make proposals, to hear the proposals plebeian. After that they develop a 
series of powers, including: 
 - the intercessio 
 - the coercitio  
 The intercession was indeed a revolutionary Tribunician power is the ability to veto 
all decisions and actions that are harmful in some way to be judged by the tribunes of the 
plebs as inappropriate for the interests of the populace itself. This veto could be brought 
against all the organs of the civitas: Magistrates, the Senate, Comizi. Should be noted that 
this type of power had not character well determined from the beginning. It was only a 
general power of opposition, and that gradually extends to cover any possible hypothesis (De 
Martino,1958). It is expressed by the technical term of prohibere: it has two meanings : to 
prevent : 
 - That the act deemed harmful or unlawful is fulfilled 
 - That arise from an act detrimental consequences. 
 In other words, has two aspects: 
 - Prohibition 
 - Termination. 
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 Instead coercitio consists in a right to personally execute their own decisions, 
inflicting a penalty to the violator(Fabbrini,1971). This power is also called coercendi 
summa potestas and the tribune comes as a byproduct of its sacred character. The manner in 
which the coercitio option will apply are: 
 - The power to stop the consuls 
 - The power to punish for infringement of the leges sacratae  
 - The power to impose tax 
 - The power to enforce judgments 
 - The power to prosecute . 
 
1.1.3 Defensor civitatis 
 In its first origin, the defensor was a magistrate which relied the only assignment, to 
defend the inhabitants of his city, and especially the plebeians, from every kind of 
oppression(Romano,1957). The defensor had to exercise this function not only of the various 
classes of citizens, defending the weak against potentiores, but also between the governors 
and the governed, protecting them from the abuses of the former. So he arose with the only 
office to protect and defend the plebeians. In fact, in addition to the name of defensor 
civitatis, he is spent designated by the name of defensor plebis and also with that of Patronus 
plebis. There is a tendency to compare the defensor civitatis with the ancient tribune of the 
plebs. There is a very strong analogy between the one and the other institution. They 
proposed the same end and the means of attaining it coincided to a certain point. The 
defensor civitatis was established for the first time on 27 -IV -364 in Illyria by a constitution 
of the emperors Valens and Valentiano addressed in Probus. However, it must be pointed out 
that only 385 from all the provinces of the empire have their defensores(Romano,1957). 
 Under the domination of the Ostrogoths, the defensor always retained the mixed 
nature destination for state and municipal destination by virtue of the fact that it continued to 
be appointed by the King on the appointment of city residents(Mastropasqua, 2003). In this 
period, the defensor worked with vitality and further increased its power thanks to the 
contribution of additional features such as : 
 1 . supervision of market prices 
 2 . regulate the activity of the markets in general 
 3 . treat the collection of taxes 
 4 . to prepare the documents necessary to give validity to contracts for the sale of real 
estate 
 5 . certify municipal deeds . 
 The Defensor at a later date was completely suppressed under the eastern emperor 
Leo IV "the Wise " ( 866-911 ) (Mastropasqua, 2003). 
 
1.2 The Ombudsman in modern times 
 For centuries the concept of ombudsman seems to have disappeared into thin air, until 
in 1713 the absolute monarch Charles XII instituted the Hogste Ombudsman. This was the 
remedy institutional innovation that would not bring chaos during the 13 years of his long 
absence around the world. In 1719, the Supreme Ombudsman them have conferred the title 
Chancellor for Justice (Justitiekanslern). And in 1766 the Chancelleries Justice was 
transformed into a Parliamentary Ombudsman, namely a commissioner in charge of 
oversight of the bureaucracy and justice. In the act that enacted this change, the Riksdag 
(Swedish Parliament) established that this new institution should enjoy all the confidence 
that a free people could tune to each individual and that the holders of that office should be 
appointed by the electorate MPs. The duration of appointment was the same as the 
legislature and the owners were required to submit a written report on the whole they remain 
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in office. The statute provided that anyone could freely access the Ombudsman to request his 
intervention on whatever they considered a tort committed by a public official, which could 
also have been reported. This reform is finally restored in the Swedish constitution enacted 
June 6, 1809(Wennergren,1973). From this year it is noted that the Swedish experience is 
widespread and embraced in many other areas and countries, but also bearing in mind the 
conditions and the unique history of each country. There are several evaluation criteria in 
order to find all models of civil defense in the world today. Currently there are five criteria 
basis for a classification of the various models(de Vergottini, 1994). The analysis of these 
five criteria for grouping with their respective subdivisions will be the subject of special 
study in this paragraph. The first criterion of individuation takes into account the 
relationship between the Ombudsman and the constitutional bodies. There are four 
models that are identified using the above criteria(la Bella,2004): 
 - The parliamentary model. And the model of civic defense offered by the 
Ombudsman Scandinavian. It is a model arose as an offshoot of the legislative, 
administrative and inspection function dependent on the executive who must make informed 
Parliament through a regular report. In the later stage, when the figure of the original 
Parliamentary Ombudsman is consolidated, as he also has powers of protection of individual 
and collective interests of the various parties. 
 - The parliamentary-government model. This is the original Scandinavian 
ombudsman, but that becomes a fruit processing changes to be adopted in a particular 
context. This is the case of the UK Parliamentary Commissioner and the Ombudsman 
French. While remaining the criterion of the fiduciary relationship between the Ombudsman 
and Parliament, the holder body is appointed by the government and the search for 
information, through the possibility of access to the Parliamentary Commissioner, is filtered 
through an instance to be presented to a member of Parliament. 
 - The governmental model. It is stated in Germany for example, where there is the 
delegate for immigration, the delegate for the disabled, the federal guarantor for the 
protection of data. It's Ombudsman trust the government, operating in various sectors of 
public administration. 
 - The spontaneous model. It is located in a position completely outside the state 
apparatus organization, as it has no ties with both the parliament and with the government. 
This refers to a kind of third sector organization, such as the various committees of consumer 
protection, the courts of the sick, the doors complaints. 
 A second evaluation criterion is that of territorial jurisdiction. Keeping this 
criterion we can distinguish between Ombudsman : 
 - National. Belong to this type of cases, Sweden, Great Britain, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain and Austria, where there are parliamentary delegates with skills generalized 
throughout the country. 
 - Sub - national. Join here all forms of decentralization envisaged, for example, in 
France, where there are the departmental representatives Mediateur the only national, or 
Britain itself where we find the commissioner for the health service in England, one in Wales 
and one in Scotland, all delegates of the Parliamentary Commissioner. 
 - Local. And the model represented by real local Ombudsman, as in the Italian case. 
 The third evaluation criterion takes into account the competence for the matter. 
Based on this criterion, we identify two examples of Ombudsman : 
 - General Competence   
 - Expertise in specialized area, such as the Parliamentary Commissioner for the 
Armed Forces in Germany or that of the protection for children in Norway. 
 The fourth criterion evaluates the organizational structure in distinguishing the 
Ombudsman. So we have two models : 
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 - The Collegial model, the typical model of Sweden, where even today what is called 
Ombudsman is composed of four different subjects. 
 - The Monocratic model, based on a single subject, who heads the office. 
 The last evaluation criterion , but no less important because it is precisely this that 
makes the most difference distinguishes the Ombudsman according to the functions 
assigned to them. The theme of the functions is closely linked to that of the powers of the 
Ombudsman. A "dilemma" the applicant regards, for example, whether it should be only 
"organ of influence" or "organ of effective protection". In the first case, the Ombudsman 
would only power signaling, recommendation or warning. In the second case, however, it 
would be more effective powers of nature "coercive". In the context of these dilemmas 
should read the variety of functions that, in addition to those 'classic' ombudsman, are 
expected to head to the Ombudsman under the laws of the various countries: control 
functions, functions of settling conflicts, functions reform, and functions of political and 
democratic representation. 
 So this figure is present in Finland (1919), Norway (1952), Denmark (1954), West 
Germany (1957), New Zealand (1962), Great Britain (1967), Israel (1971), France (1973), 
Portugal (1976), Luxembourg (1976), Austria (1977), Spain (1978), Ireland (1980), The 
Netherlands (1981), etc. . This process resulted in not only the spread of the Swedish original 
model, but also its separation into different logs, which once provided for in the constitutions 
of each country, trying to adapt to a specific context, thus creating new models and also 
variations arising of the original Swedish contemporary era . 
  
1.3 The evolution of the Ombudsman to the European level 
 Still in regard to the subject on the ombudsman is noteworthy development of that 
institution at the European level. This is because at this level there is an ombudsman 
institution that transcends national boundaries national ombudsman. In fact it is a completely 
different context, which is where the ombudsman community. In fact, rather than in a 
universe inspired by the principle of separation of powers, predominant in Western 
democracies, in Maastricht, the ombudsman system is, as it were, immersed in an 
environment based on the principle of specificity of competence (Ubertazzi, 1992). The law 
is the product of a common organization, but has no constitutional foundations as national 
law. And an anomalous union constitutions, a new order in middle between international law 
and domestic law (Morbidelli, 2009). As of February 7, 1992, when the Maastricht Treaty 
was signed at the European level was settled the European Ombudsman. And just art. 138E 
is made clear that the institution of the European Ombudsman. Literally art. 138E (1) 
provides: "The European Parliament shall appoint an Ombudsman empowered to receive 
complaints from any citizen of the Union or any natural or legal person residing or having its 
registered office in a Member State concerning instances of maladministration activities of 
the institutions or bodies, with the exception of the Court of Justice and the Court of First 
Instance acting in their judicial role".So the art.138E, does not determine clearly and 
precisely what skills has the Mediator. It only puts limits that are connected with the explicit 
acts in the exercise of judicial functions by the Court and the Court of First Instance. In Art. 
138E can be deduced that the recurs of European Mediator is a right that belongs to every 
citizen of the European Union. So when the EU citizen has recourse to the Ombudsman 
exercises his right of citizenship, which in fact belongs to them as a European citizen. But 
that article also shows that EU citizens are not the only ones who have the right to appeal to 
the Ombudsman. In fact, the other category of persons recognized as entitled persons are 
also citizens of third States, which enjoy such rights as they have their registered office in a 
Member State of the European Union. In a Union "ever closer union among the peoples of 
Europe, in which decisions are always taken as close as possible to the citizen" (Article A), 
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the introduction of citizenship is a means to achieve one of the objectives of the Union same, 
namely "strengthen the protection of the rights and interests of the nationals of its Member 
States". In addition to identifying individuals who may have recourse to the Ombudsman, it 
remains important to identify the subject of a possible appeal to the Ombudsman. Article. 
138E was very clear in this direction. Subject of an appeal to the Ombudsman may be 
situations of maladministration by EU institutions. But, unfortunately, the Maastricht Treaty 
was not so clear in defining what situations fall in cases of poor administration. Thus leaving 
ample space in the courts in the interpretation of that provision. And on the other side, 
leaving puzzled Europeans on a possible competence of the Ombudsman or less a matter of 
maladministration. A particular importance also takes the analysis of the relationship 
between the European Parliament and the European Ombudsman. Is easy to see that the 
appointing authority in accordance with Art. 138E of the Maastricht Treaty for the European 
Parliament. But once the Ombudsman is appointed by its parliament, the latter still continues 
to exercise powers on it. In fact, it is still the European Parliament to determine the 
regulations and general conditions of functioning of the Ombudsman in accordance with 
section 4 of Art. 138E of the Maastricht Treaty. To my opinion the art.138E is itself 
contradictory, because on the one hand as the European Parliament with powers so large that 
go beyond the appointment of the Ombudsman, and therefore Parliament has powers of 
control estimates on the Ombudsman, as the Statute of the Ombudsman is determined by the 
Parliament and also the general conditions of the progress of the Ombudsman. And on the 
other hand, provides a point 3 in that article. 138E, according to which, the Ombudsman 
shall perform his duties in full independence and in the performance of its functions do not 
take instructions from anyone. I think it is on these bases if the model of the European 
Ombudsman chosen by the Treaty of Maastricht was considered a "parliamentary model"( 
Rinaldi, 1992). Precisely for this reason in the European Parliament has emphasized that "the 
nature and purpose (the Ombudsman) can not be understood without reference to the control 
functions of the European Parliament, with respect to which the Ombudsman plays the role 
of high responsibility for the control of smooth administrative functioning of the institutions 
and bodies"( Rinaldi, 1992). So framed and finalized the tasks of the European Ombudsman, 
the European Parliament is "the conditions of complementarity" between that institution and 
the right to petition, "essentially trying to strengthen the protection of the citizen before 
administration, and at the same time, to maintain control of their own political system of the 
petition". About the power of the petition it is worth mentioning another article of the 
Maastricht Treaty, art. 8 -8D. This article provides: " Every citizen of the Union has the right 
to petition the European Parliament in accordance with Art.138D. Every citizen of the Union 
may apply to the European Ombudsman in accordance with Article .138E ". Apparently , art. 
8 -8D opens a path with two possibilities for European citizens: or a petition to the European 
Parliament, or the complaint to the European Ombudsman. In this way, once again end up 
being contradictory, as it does not specify exactly which cases fall within the competence of 
Parliament and such cases, however, fall within the remit of the Ombudsman. But there is 
even more. There is a certain tendency to qualify as such a discriminatory provision in the 
Treaty of Maastricht (Saulle,1994). First of all because there is a difference between the 
petition and the complaint, which must be grasped in the fact that, while in the case of the 
petition calling for the establishment of a form of protection where this is absent in the case, 
however, a complaint you have the demand to assert and exercise a specific right of the 
individual or group. And then, " compete ", ask, to advocate the creation of a rule of law that 
previously did not exist. It is worth to mention a very important historical event in the 
context of petitions. Even before they signed the Maastricht Treaty on European Union, the 
European Parliament has decided to create a Committee on Petitions in all respects. In doing 
so, the European Parliament "external" about his opposition about a possible opportunity to 
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create a "European Ombudsman". This is because it would weaken the powers of the 
Parliament and its committees about the control of the Commission and its services and 
would represent a new structure superposition and to the detriment of the already existing, 
represented by the Committee on Petitions. And in fact it is the subsequent behavior of the 
Parliament which states that hypothesis. After the Maastricht Treaty was signed, the 
Committee on Petitions wanted to point out that: "The Commission of the European 
Communities is the recipient of the 'natural', from the point of view of the institutional 
demands of the European Parliament. The petitions allow you to snap parliamentary control 
in areas that might not otherwise be subject to investigation, and also allow the Commission 
to intervene in member states in accordance with the procedures in force if the petitions 
highlighting the existence of infringements of Community law. Through petitions, in 
particular, you can examine the application of the law and its control by the Commission. 
The Commission itself (...) states that it is based on very considerable extent on complaints 
and petitions to exert its main activity as "guardian of Community law". A mechanism such 
petition has delineated a primary role is to solicit business "investigation" which in turn 
strengthens the controlling power of the European Parliament. In this role, looking for any 
small space able to strengthen its position in the inter-institutional relations, obviously does 
not want to give up (Rinaldi, 1992). In these reflections I add also one definitive. We must 
not forget that the European Parliament of the European Union does not represent the 
traditional model of the national parliament. The European Parliament does not have the 
legislative power is the power that a fundamental characteristic of the national parliament. 
Being a weak parliament, not having the traditional power that is legislative, it is clear that 
Parliament would do anything to customize any power that could enhance its role and thus 
strengthen its position in front of the  other EU institutions. Apart from the relations with the 
European Parliament, the European Ombudsman Institution is an organ of particular 
importance. Just as he says himself, he works at the same time as a body outside and inside 
the European Union. It acts as an external mechanism of control, instructing the appeals for 
maladministration and recommending corrective action where necessary. On the other hand, 
the Ombudsman serves as a resource for institutions helping them to improve their conduct 
in the performance of their duties by directing their attention on the areas where you need 
improvement. The sole purpose of both cases is to improve the service offered to its citizens. 
However, taking what we have stated previously, the European Ombudsman based its work 
on the same acts which it adopts European Parliament: The Statute and the Code of Good 
Administrative Behaviour. By its decision of 9 March 1994, the European Parliament 
adopted its Statute which governs the terms and conditions of exercise of the functions 
assigned to him. By virtue of this Statute, the Ombudsman has the following connotations: 
 - Is appointed by the European Parliament, to which every year sends them a report on 
its work, pointing to the abuses, irregularities and malfunctions encountered and suggesting 
remedies  
 - Is fully independent of the bodies and the term of office coincides with that of the 
legislature, and then he was appointed after each election of the European Parliament 
 - The dismissal is decided by the Court of Justice in cases where the holder of the 
organ is not the most suitable to perform the task or has been guilty of serious 
 - Is entitled to receive from anyone residing in the territory of the Union or is a 
national, complaints and reports in order to maladministration relating solely to the 
institutions and bodies 
 - Carries out the relevant investigations and activate its powers of intervention , 
questioning the purpose the officer in charge and try to get to a point of compromise 
 - Has no enforcement powers or binding powers 
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 - Shall dismiss the complaint and shall terminate its examination in all cases where it 
concerns a "deal" (Mastropasqua, 2003), in respect of which hangs or is subsequently 
established a procedure before a court of law. The Code of Conduct was adopted by a 
resolution of the European Parliament of 6 September 2001. The adoption of the Code of 
Good Administrative Behaviour aims precisely to achieve the goals of the institution. Given 
that the maladministration is presented as a key competence of the Ombudsman, it seems 
reasonable to specify which behaviors of the European administration may be designated as 
such. Just on that basis I think it is resentful at the beginning of the institution of the 
European Ombudsman, the need for the provision of a code of good conduct on which the 
Ombudsman was based on his work. It is worth mentioning that in earlier years of the 
adoption of this Code, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 
proclaimed at the Nice summit in 2000, contained in his art.41 a provision titled " Right to 
good administration." Article . 41 provides: " 
 - 1.Any citizen has the right to the issues that concern are handled impartially , fairly 
and within a reasonable time by the institutions and bodies of the Union . 
 - 2.Such right includes : 
 - A. the right of every person to be heard against him before any individual measure is 
taken that would adversely affect 
 - B . the right of every person to have access to his or her file , while respecting the 
legitimate interests of confidentiality and professional secrecy 
 - C . the obligation of the administration to give reasons for its decisions 
 - 3.Any individual has the right to have the Community make good any damage 
caused by its institutions or by its servants in the performance of their duties in accordance 
with the general principles common to the laws of the Member States . 
 - 4.Every person may write to the institutions of the Union in one of the languages of 
the Treaties and must have an answer in the same language . 
 The same European Ombudsman in his report in 1997 helped in the definition of 
maladministration by stating that "we are in the presence of maladministration occurs when a 
public body fails to act in accordance with a rule or principle which is binding upon it". 
Among the principles that are laid down in the Code we may mention that of legality (Art. 
4), the absence of discrimination (Art.5), proportionality (Art.6), the absence of abuse of 
power (Art.7), impartiality and independence (art.8), objectivity (Art. 9), legitimate 
expectations, consistency and advice (Art.10), equality ( Art.11), courtesy (Art.12) , response 
to letters in the language of the citizen (Art.13), notification of decisions (Art. 20), data 
protection (Art. 21). As you can see it is already known from first principles in the European 
context . Apart from the recovery of these principles, art. 26 is also taken recourse through 
complaints to the Ombudsman as a means of security against any default on the part of an 
officer of such principles . 
 
1.3 A model of regional ombudsmen: the Italian case 
 It should immediately be pointed out that in Italy there isn’t an ombudsman at the 
national level. But on the other hand, the ombudsman is very present at the regional level, in 
the provinces and municipalities. This fact may lead us to think that so many experiences 
ombuds constructed so they can consolidate a single model of civic defense. But, instead, 
lead to a fragmentation and disarticulation of the civic culture(La Bella, 2004). 
Fragmentation and disarticulation which in turn are due to a lack of entrenchment of a 
culture of political-administrative unit, or due to the objective difficulty to design and 
implement coordinated strategies for regulating relations between the community and the 
state administration. Various were the negotiations to adopt an ombudsman at the national 
level in Italy. The first and foremost was the bill on February 5, 1965(La Bella, 2004), but 
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failed due to the fact that the institutional architecture of the Italian system, provided that 
these powers were reserved to the Chambers, being that you initially wanted to adopt a 
model of the Parliamentary Commissioner, the appointing authority of which rests with the 
parliament. Given that the attempt to adopt an ombudsman at the national level failed, in the 
70's you have the "regionalization" of the phenomenon. We can identify three historical 
phases of the adoption of the Regional Ombudsman(La Bella, 2004): 
 - The phase "constituent" "which takes place in the years 1974-75 and coincides with 
the adoption of the first two regional laws of Tuscany and Liguria . 
 - The stage of "transition" , "which takes place in the years 1976-80, when this 
phenomenon is spreading to other Italian regions. 
 - The phase of "consolidation", which takes place since the early 90's. It is 
characterized by redefining the one hand the type of public bodies should be subject to 
review by the ombudsman and the other, the type of subjects that can enable the regional 
office of the ombudsman . 
 The practice of the regional ombudsman testifies to a widening " fact" of its 
responsibilities(Comba,1995). The main functions of the Ombudsman are: 
 - The protection of individual positions of citizens towards the Administration 
 - Ensuring efficiency and good performance in general administration. 
 Both see the ombudsman in an intermediate position between the citizen and the 
administration, but while the former emphasizes the link between the ombudsman and 
citizen, the second gives the Ombudsman a role almost Auxiliary Administration 
(Sandulli,1989). With regard to this second function, so in relation to the control on the 
efficiency and smooth running of the government, it would not be too dissimilar, despite the 
obvious difference of situation, that of the administrative law judge under the supervision of 
the operations of the legitimacy public administration. The administrative judge, according 
to the known theory of protection reflex protects the legitimate interests of citizens as such, 
but because doing so also serves the public interest of the legality of administrative action.  
 Already from its first reports, the Ombudsman notes that the Tuscan most of the 
requests of citizens is not related to regional authorities, but mainly in those state. This is 
because perhaps the beginning of the adoption of this figure at the regional level, the citizens 
knew what were the powers and limits of such a body. Or because, for me it is a fundamental 
reason, the needs of citizens at the time felt the need for an ombudsman just at the national 
level. And it was precisely these needs who founded an opinio iuris in the matter, which in 
turn leads to two figures in the creation of civic defender(Comba,1995): 
 - The " de jure "  
 - And the " de facto ". 
 The ombudsman "in fact", where it acts outside the jurisdiction conferred by law, has 
not provided even though the limited range of technical and legal instruments which are 
instead provided for by the legislation establishing the ombudsman "of law". For a greater 
extension of the sphere of action of the ombudsman "in fact" corresponds to a minor 
technicality of the instruments used , compared to those that the law provides to the 
ombudsman "of law". As early as the 80s had noticed the changes that it had begun to play 
"on the role of a broker firm that the role of controller" (Pizzeti,1984). Instead, the prediction 
of the ombudsman at the provincial and municipal starts from the 90's. The first laws to the 
rank of municipalities and provinces were those n.142 and n.241 of 1990. We can say that 
these two laws are different by nature and goals(Pizzeti,1993). In fact, while the Law n. 241 
of 1990 directly protects the procedural rights of the individual , the law n .142 of 1990 
protects them indirectly through the enhancement of local self-government, and then through 
the differentiation of guarantee schemes. The Ombudsman referred to in Law no. 142 of 
1990 can be understood as an instrument additional to those provided for by Law no. 241 of 
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1990 , from which it is distinguished by its greater variety of its forms and its mode of 
action. Exactly the art . 8 of Law no. 142 titled "ombudsman " includes: 
 1 . The Statute may provide for the municipal and provincial institution of the 
ombudsman, who plays the role of guarantor of impartiality and good performance of the 
municipal or provincial public administration, reporting, on their own initiative, abuse, 
malfunction, the shortages and delays of the administration towards the citizens . 
 2 . The statute governing the election, the powers and resources of the Ombudsman as 
well as its relations with the municipal or provincial council. Therefore, the provision in 
question states that the statute is to provide for the establishment of the ombudsman, that 
statute must have a minimum content required with regard to the rules governing the 
election, the powers and means of action and the type of relationships that are established by 
the City Council (Gorga, 2005). Thus was preserved the value of the constitutionally 
guaranteed autonomy of local authorities, but at the same time it is threatened and you are 
likely to create a different system of guarantee for citizens depending on the municipality or 
province. At provincial and municipal level, there has been a mass distribution of 
Ombudsmen. It is a completely legitimate behavior because each statute has the right to 
establish its own ombudsman. But in addition to providing the right to appoint their own 
ombudsman, statutes and regulations also provide, especially in smaller municipalities, the 
possibility : 
 - Or agree with other administrations to establish an ombudsman only 
 - Or to make use of already established an ombudsman, which is generally the 
regional level(Comba,1995). 
 Particular attention I think deserve the powers of appointment and the requirements 
for the office of the ombudsman. The Ombudsman is elected by the regional council by a 
majority of two-thirds of the directors and may be revoked for serious reasons by the same 
majority. An exception to the rules provided by the Lazio Region in which it is established 
for the appointment and revocation of the three-quarters majority. Its headquarters is 
everywhere scheduled at the Regional Council (de Vergottini,1994). Several regional laws 
cases of ineligibility for the office of the ombudsman. The ineligibility is provided 
particularly for : 
 - Members of the National Parliament 
 - The regional, provincial and municipal 
 - The members of the Regional Monitoring Committee 
 - The directors of institutions and public enterprises, semi-public or otherwise 
restricted to the region to work or administration of contracts or grants. 
 They recognized, however, such as eligibility requirements: 
 - The right to vote in a town in the region 
 - A particular legal-administrative competence that gives "guarantee of independence, 
objectivity, serenity of judgment " 
 - Belonging to some specific categories such as "professors of the University in the 
fields of law, judges of the ordinary courts even at rest or administrative sponsoring lawyers 
in the Supreme Court for more than 10 years". 
 
Conclusion 
 The first thing to point out , just after finishing the analysis of this argument is that it 
does not matter if it comes from different countries in which the institution of Ombudsman 
has been provided, or the different times in which the institution has been adopted. The 
Ombudsman has characteristics  that are common to many experiences. These features are: 
 - The Ombudsman is an emanation of the legislative power 
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 - And, in principle, also independent from the legislative power, although a 
parliamentary committee can oversee the administration, the staff and the decisions of the 
Ombudsman 
 - Is a prestigious and influential figure that these characteristics based on the 
independence, objectivity, competence and impartiality. He is seen as the personification of 
the law and ensuring that the law is not upheld by public officials. 
 - The Ombudsman may act on its own but in most cases, are private litigation that put 
it in motto. 
 - An Ombudsman conducts impartial investigations, has the right to call anyone to get 
information, and has free access to official documents 
 - Usually used procedures free, quick and informal 
 - It does not have the power to issue orders and impose sanctions 
 - Keeps continuous reports and annual reports with the parliament, which contains 
specifically of all the activity in this time 
 - Always communicates the reasons for which a claim can not be taken into account 
by him, is that it is unfounded or that does not fall within its jurisdiction 
 - You can always make inspection visits to the authorities , either because that option 
falls within its powers of a general nature or to investigate a complaint about 
 - You can always suggest or recommend changes or improvements in administrative 
procedures 
 - He has a great psychological value for the population. 
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